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COMMENTS

Objectivity and Accountability:
Limits on Judicial Involvement in
Settlement
The 1983 amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure encourage judicial involvement in settlement. When
judges become heavily involved in negotiations between or among
parties to suit, however, procedural safeguards against judicial bias
disappear. Such bias may affect the substance of settlement or the
outcome at trial if the settlement fails. Judges may misuse docket
control mechanisms or other settlement techniques in order to coerce agreement, even to the point of denying due process to litigants. Yet judicial involvement in settlement is perceived as speeding the disposition of cases. As a result, a fundamental tension
exists between the goal of ethical judicial conduct and the goal of
efficient judicial administration.
The rules which presently regulate judicial behavior are chiefly
concerned with the danger that judicial involvement in settlement
will interfere with a judge's impartiality at trial. This perspective
has spawned its own critique of case-management techniques, articulated most fully by Professor Resnik." Both the present rules
and the existing critique are helpful to a point, but in a sense, both
are inadequate. They may guard the trial, but provide insufficient
protection against bias in settlement agreements themselves.
This comment is motivated by a concern which is derived
from but goes deeper than concern for impartiality at trial. The
possibility of bias at trial enhances a judge's power to foster settlement, but not in a way that the judicial system should wish to encourage. The parties know that the judge will ultimately decide the
merits of the case if the settlement negotiations fail. As a result,
judicial evaluations and statements of opinion about the law or
facts gain extra force and become opportunities for judicial coerJudith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 376 (1982).
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cion. During settlement negotiations, judges may make representations about the law and facts which would be unsupportable if
made on the record, subject to judicial review. A judge may
thereby dispose of a case by settlement, without subjecting that
legal outcome to the public scrutiny which is, or at least should be,
a prerequisite to any exercise of judicial power.2
This comment contends that judges should only encourage
settlement in ways which do not allow the judge to utilize the
power of his or her position to coerce settlement. Under this approach, the judge may encourage settlement through the use of
neutral time pressure; by requiring the parties to participate in a
settlement negotiation, as long as the judge remains an impartial
moderator; or through the use of on-the-record techniques such as
decisions regarding admissibility of evidence and/or choice of law.
Part I develops the theory behind this position. Part II discusses
-the existing decisions, rules, and ethical canons that affect judicial
conduct in this context, and demonstrates the inadequacy of both
their theoretical bases and positive prescriptions. Part III discusses
alternative techniques which, though acceptable under present ethical guidelines, allow serious risk of coercion, as exemplified by In
re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation.3 Part IV proposes a
solution.
I.

SEPARATING THE MEDIATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS

Martin Shapiro offers us a view of litigation as a triangular
process that develops as follows.4 Two neighbors disagree about
their rights in a particular piece of land. Discussion breaks down,
and they agree to submit their dispute to a third party for resolution. The judge is the embodiment of the disinterested decision
maker.5 A prerequisite to the neighbors' choice of a third party is
that the third party will not take sides.

2

Owen M. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 12-17.

3 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
Martin Shapiro, The Logic of the Triad, reprinted in Robert M. Cover and Owen M.
Fiss, The Structure of Procedure 284, 285 (1979).
' Fiss challenges the accuracy of the dispute resolution story as an account of the function of the judiciary. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). The
criticism has merit, but the goal of this comment is to accept the dispute resolution model
on its own terms, and to articulate the concern with judicial involvement in settlement
through the use of arguments intrinsic to the dispute resolution model.
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A. Settlement in the Real World-The Danger of Coercion
Today, when parties choose to litigate, they do not have the
option of choosing a single person in the community known for his
or her impartiality. They choose not a person but an institution.
Parties cannot select a particular judge, but in return the judiciary
provides a set of processes which seek to protect the impartiality of
all judges. The primary procedural safeguard of impartiality is the
public nature of on-the-record judicial action.' On-the-record law
and fact are subject to appellate review. Even rulings on discovery
motions are given with justification on the record.
When a case is settled, however, these procedural protections
are absent. This is not a problem when settlement negotiations are
purely private. Public power has not been invoked to achieve the
settlement. If, however, a judge becomes involved, he or she may
attempt to apply pressure on one of the parties to settle the cAse.
Unlike a purely private settlement, such a settlement involves the
exercise of public power effected in private.
The danger of undue coercion becomes particularly acute
when one recognizes that a judge who may favor a particular result
has an opportunity to use threats of sanctions or unfavorable treatment at trial-in addition to making representations as to his own
view of the law and facts-to make a decision and then effectively
insulate it from review by bringing about a settlement. And since
judges have a personal interest in keeping their dockets under control, the incentive exists for judges to exercise their power
accordingly.
Thus, a judge is different from any other third party enlisted
to aid in the negotiation of a settlement. A private mediator may
make substantive suggestions about how a case should be resolved,
because he is not the person who will ultimately try the case.
When settlement is promoted by a judge there is a link between
the mediative function and the judicial function which lends coercive force to statements by the judge. The power to mediate may
become the power to decide-without procedural constraint or
substantive accountability.
I In

their contributions to this symposium, both Professor Resnik and Professor Fiss
emphasize the importance of the public nature of decision making. Fiss, 1987 U. Chi. Legal
F. at 12-17 (cited in note 2); Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 43, 73.
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The Rooster in the Henhouse, or "Don't worry about us, we're
judges."

Three concerns emerge out of this scenario: concern for judicial impartiality; concern that the dual role of mediator and adjudicator creates the possibility of coercion; and, finally, concern that
biased judges may impose their bias by forcing settlement, thereby
avoiding the safeguards provided by the judicial process. Judicial
attempts to enunciate limits on the judicial role in facilitating settlement focus first on impartiality, but most proposals by the judiciary fail to account for the power inherent in the dual position of
mediator and judge, and the resulting danger of procedural evasion
and substantive abuse. As a result, most prescriptions for judicial
conduct do not go far enough.
For example, in 1977, in a seminar for newly appointed district judges, District Judges Will, Merhige and Rubin advised the
new judges to get involved in settlement as much as possible while
keeping within the bounds of accepted judicial ethics.7 Their suggestions were are all carefully stated in neutral terms. They included techniques such as: (1) supervising the parties' efforts to
settle; (2) helping the parties calculate a reasonable value to assign
to the case; (3) setting rigid deadlines to expedite the case; (4)
moving the case to another jurisdiction to increase the incentive to
settle by making litigation inconvenient; (5) having each party argue the other's side; and (6) arguing each party's case to its opponent or opponents. The judges then warned new judges to avoid
any contact with the parties which might give rise to presumptions
of impropriety."
Although they offered no definition of impropriety, they carefully chose techniques which operate, or at least appear to operate,
with equal force against both parties. These techniques, however,
present potential difficulties. When, for example, a judge argues

7 Robert R. Merhige, Jr. and Alvin B. Rubin, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement
Process 4-7 (1977). This was one of a series of seminars conducted by the Federal Judicial
Center as part of its Education and Training series.
8 Even the appearance of impropriety creates problems in settlement, because it undermines the presumption of justice and fairness in the judicial process. Illustrative is the case
of Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986), in which the Alabama Supreme Court
justice who wrote the opinion in an insurance claim case had previously filed two actions
against insurance companies alleging bad faith failure to file claims. The United States Supreme Court concluded that the justice was disqualified from participation in the case on
account of his "direct, personal, substantial and pecuniary" interest in the case. Id. at 1586.
The decision was vacated, not because it was necessarily inaccurate, but in order to preserve
the "appearance of justice." Id. at 1589.
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the case of one party to the other, there is a strong possibility that
these statements by the judge may be taken by the parties to reflect the judge's own thinking on the subject.
This underlines the problem with all judicial suggestions of
appropriate conduct in settlement negotiations to date. The judges
simply assume that they will be able to remain impartial in the
face of temptation and in the absence of supervision. They assume
that they are the same as any other mediators, and are therefore
free to use any effective mediative techniques. Judges sometimes
misconstrue the consequences of their actions.
The danger of this position is demonstrated, unwittingly, by
Judge Lambros. Judge Lambros, who favors extremely active judicial intervention on behalf of settlement,9 expresses concern regarding judicial bias, but his suggestions are inconsistent with that
concern. He strongly advocates the use of special masters or magistrates in pretrial settlement negotiations in order to avoid compromising the judge's impartiality.'" At the same time, he suggests
that a judge should express his opinion as to the merits of a case
during those negotiations. In addition, he asserts that a judge may
be in a better position than the parties to assess the settlement
value of the case." Settlements, Lambros argues, are not illegitimate, as long as the settlement approximates the outcome that
would occur at a properly conducted trial. 2 This is true, but Lambros provides no basis for concluding that judicial intervention will
reach that result.
The risk of coerced settlement is compounded when a judge
speaks to one or the other party in isolation. The dangers of this
technique were demonstrated graphically in the Agent Orange
case,"' where Judge Weinstein, working through settlement masters, achieved a settlement at least in part by conveying differing
assessments of the value of the case to each of the parties. The
technique led to a settlement, but one must question whether the
judiciary should encourage settlements through judicial
4
misrepresentation.

1 See Thomas D. Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29
Vill. L. Rev. 1363 (1984).
Id. at 1371-73.
" Id. at 1364.
12 Id. at 1371.
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
" See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent
Orange Example, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337 (1986).
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C. Towards Settlement With Process
Thus, there are strong incentives for a judge to coerce settlement, and the danger of coercion is greatest when there is a link
between the mediative and adjudicative functions. 15 When a judge
states his or her opinions or is allowed to make representations
about the law, the merits, or the value of a case to the parties, the
likelihood increases that the judge will be able to bring his or her
bias to bear against a disfavored party. Since settlement does not
produce a written reasoned opinion, it is unreviewable by an appellate court. 16 At least one principle emerges from this discussion.
Any satisfactory set of principles governing judicial conduct in settlement negotiations must strive to guarantee the separation of the
mediative and adjudicative functions. As a starting point, the principles should forbid any-judicial representations as to the value of
the case or the state of the law in any proceeding prior to trial.
II.
A.

THE

Focus

ON OBJECTIVITY AT TRIAL

Development and Application of the "Objectivity at Trial"
Standard

Concern about judicial bias emerging from judicial involvement in settlement negotiations and in case management has generally focused on the judge's ability to serve as an objective decision maker at trial. 17 Allegations of judicial bias generally arise
after trial. After trial, the only question is whether the judge's conduct during failed settlement negotiations resulted in bias at the
trial itself. There is no similar review of settlements. When a judge
successfully fosters a settlement, the issue of objectivity at trial is
rendered moot. As a result, no equivalent standard has developed
defining appropriate conduct in settlement negotiations. During
" As a point of comparison with the American adversary system, Professor Langbein
observes that the German civil procedure system takes advantage of the mediative/administrative link, but with built-in safeguards. In the German system, the judge gathers the facts
with the help and suggestions of counsel. The judge is expected to encourage settlement,
and he gives his views as to the merits of the case as it proceeds. The judge's integrity is
protected and justice is preserved by the presence and input of all parties, so there are no ex
parte contacts. In addition, German judges are career judges so that they are generally sufficiently concerned about their professional reputations to avoid questionable conduct. The
judge in German procedure is not expected to be just an impartial adjudicator, so there is
little concern that improper influence will be exerted on or by theparties or that extrajudicial information will endanger the validity of the result. John H. Langbein, The German
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823 (1985).
"eResnik, 96 Harv. L. Rev. at 376 (cited in note 1).
17

Id.
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settlement negotiations, a judge is therefore required to evaluate
his or her own conduct during negotiations in light of its potential
effect on a hypothetical future decision-a meaningless inquiry.
1. The Focus on Information-The "ExtrajudicialSource"
Standard. The present standard for evaluating judicial conduct
18 an antiwas developed in United States v. Grinnell Corporation,
trust case in which the judge was accused of personal bias and
prejudice. Because the trial court was primarily concerned with
protecting the trial process, and not settlements, the Supreme
Court came to the conclusion that as long as all of the information
the judge acquired during the settlement negotiation derived from
"judicial sources," there was no improper judicial conduct.
In Grinnell, at the pretrial conference, defense counsel asked
the judge to suggest what he thought would be appropriate relief.
The judge complied, but recognizing the danger of bias, reprimanded the parties for forcing him to consider documents and relief prior to trial. The parties later challenged the judge's ability to
adjudicate the case impartially on those very grounds. The reviewing court found, however, that the judge's pretrial opinions were
based only on his study of the depositions and briefs, which, even
prior to trial, were proper sources of information for the judge. The
Supreme Court said that "the alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an
opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case."' 9
The Court in Grinnell was concerned that the judge had
formed an opinion about the case before trial that would affect his
decisions during and after trial. However, the standard that the
court applied allowed the judge to have pretrial information as
long as he was not influenced by sources outside of the case which
might affect his ability to reach an impartial decision.2 ° This standard does nothing to guard against the problem of judicial coercion
in settlement negotiations.
2. Ex Parte Contacts-The Inadequacy of the Focus on Information. In Medical Arts Clinic P.C. v. Henry,2 ' the court dealt

384 U.S. 563 (1966).
, Id. at 583.
20 A judge is permitted to develop opinions through legitimate judicial participation in
a case, such as adjudication of motions and presence at pretrial conferences. See sources
cited in Burr H. Glenn, Disqualification of Federal Judge, Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, For Acts
and Conduct Occurring in Courtroom During Trial or in Ruling Upon Issues of Questions
Involved, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 917 (1969).
" 484 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1986).
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with the problem of ex parte judicial communications with counsel,
emphasizing the effect of such communications on the hypothetical
future decision at trial. There, the attorney for one party had "an
ex parte in-chambers conversation with the trial judge regarding
the terminology" of the judge's order, as a result of which the
judge reviewed and modified his decree. 2
The court, in dicta, reprimanded the attorney for engaging the
judge in ex parte communications, saying:
this Court does not approve of the manner in which the
omissions or errors in the original decree were brought to
the trial court's attention. This Court cautions both
bench and bar about ex parte communications involving
pending litigation with the judge by attorneys for fewer
than all the litigants.23
Instead of disqualifying the judge, however, the appellate court upheld the decree, believing that even without the conference the
trial judge would have discovered the error pointed out by the attorney. Again, the focus was on the judge's ability to make an impartial decision at trial.24
The effect of the confusion about standards of conduct in settlement negotiations can be seen clearly in Lazofsky v. Sommerset
Bus Co., Inc.25 There, plaintiff's counsel challenged the propriety
of a conference between the judge and defense counsel in the
judge's chambers without the plaintiff's counsel being present. The
reviewing court was of the opinion that the conferences were held
in order to persuade defense counsel to make stronger efforts to
persuade their clients to settle the case.2 6 The reviewing court
found no evidence of any lower court bids against the plaintiff. In
fact, it found the court's conferences with the counsel for the defense to be beneficial to the plaintiff because they encouraged settlement. Since the plaintiff was not in fact injured by the judge's
conduct, the court declined to remove the judge for improper

22

Id. at 387.

23

Id. at 388.

21

In addition to the judge, an attorney who engages in ex parte communications as to

the merits of a proceeding with a judge or official before whom the matter is pending, without either notification or the presence of the attorney for the opposing party, may also be
subject to disciplinary action. See generally Dale R. Agthe, Disciplinary Action Against Attorney Based on Communications to Judge Respecting Merits of Cause, 22 A.L.R.4th 917
(1983).
25 389 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
26 Id. at 1044.

369]

JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT

conduct.27

By focusing on information rather than coercion, the court
missed the point. The problem was not exclusively whether the
judge learned anything from the party during the discussion, but
whether separation of the parties provided undue opportunity for
coercion. The issue was not some subtle effect on the result at trial,
but the certainty of altering the substantive content of settlement.
B. Codification of the Focus on Objectivity at Trial
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) each attempts to resolve
the problem of judicial involvement in settlement, but all fall prey
to the same shortcoming. Though concerned with impartiality at
trial, they fail to solve the problem of safeguarding impartiality
during the settlement negotiations themselves.
1. Rule 16. The pretrial conference has long been an occasion
for judges to encourage and supervise settlement discussions.2 8
This role of the judge as facilitator of settlement was recently codified in the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 16(a) lists expediting the case and facilitating settlement among the objectives of the pretrial conference.
Rule 16(c) clarifies this point, suggesting discussion of "the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve
the dispute."2
Prior to 1983, discussion of settlement was beyond the stated
scope of the pretrial conference, although in practice many judges
included facilitation of settlement within their general duties of
managing their dockets. When Rule 16 was amended in 1983, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ("Advisory Committee") noted
27 The court also suggested that plaintiff's counsel had in fact consented to the conference so that no proscribed conduct had occurred. Id. A similar result was reached in Matter
of Georgia Paneling Supply, Inc., 581 F.2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1978) (see note 40), which
involved charges of collusion between a bankruptcy judge, a trustee and a lawyer. Even
though ex parte contacts occurred, the court applied 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and did not find the
extrajudicial basis of prejudice or bias necessary to disqualify the judge. The court concluded that the occurrence of ex parte conferences between the bankruptcy judge, the trustee and the lawyer did not alone demonstrate collusion.
28 Resnik, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 96 (cited in note 6).
29 Rule 16(a), in relevant part, lists among the objectives of the pretrial conference:
"(1) expediting the disposition of the action" and "(5) facilitating the settlement of the
case." Rule 16(c) in relevant part states: "The participants at any conference under this rule
may consider and take action with respect to ... (6) the advisability of referring matters to
a magistrate or master; (7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute."
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that it had become "commonplace to discuss settlement at the pretrial conference."3 0
The Advisory Committee noted that settlement is desirable
because it eases crowded dockets, and saves time and money. The
Committee also pointed out that an advantage of including discussion of the possibility of settlement in the pretrial conference was
that it made earlier settlement more likely. Settlement would be
fostered, first by the provision of a neutral forum in which the parties could meet, such as the judge's chambers, and second, by taking the burden of suggesting settlement off the parties (because
initiating settlement discussions is sometimes considered a sign of
weakness) 31
However, Rule 16 places no limits on what the judge can do.
The Advisory Committee did not voice concern that a judge would
overreach his authority. It simply assumed that judges would be
scrupulous in avoiding doubtful situations.3 2
2. The Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3(C) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct specifically protects impartiality at trial.3 3 It requires a judge to disqualify himself in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 4
Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code comes closer to preventing coercion, although the emphasis of the rule is still primarily on information. Canon 3(A)(4) prohibits a judge from initiating or considering ex parte or other communications concerning a proceeding.3 5
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 16, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1983) (discussion of Rule 16(c)(7)).
3' Manual for Complex Litigation, Second ("MCL 2d") § 23.11 at 160 (1985). Suggestion of settlement is sometimes viewed as a sign of weakness or an admission that one's side
does not expect to succeed at trial.
32 Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 Hastings L.J.
505, 513 (1984).
'3Canon 3(C)(1), Code of Judicial Conduct, ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct (1984) ("Code of Judicial Conduct").
31Id. Instances where disqualification would be required are set out under Canon
3(C)(1) and include personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, personal knowlege of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings, service as a lawyer in the matter, service
as a material witness in the matter, or any other direct or indirect interest or relation to the
controversy.
" Canon 3(A)(4), Code of Judicial Conduct:
"A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding,
or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized by
law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a
pending or impending proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a
disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him if he gives
notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and
affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond."

369]

JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT

The judge is discouraged even from consulting disinterested third
parties unless the litigants are notified and given a chance to
respond.36
This prohibition against ex parte or other communications is
similar to the prohibition against obtaining information from extrajudicial sources. If all parties are present, conferences with the
judge do not involve ex parte communications. Rather, they resemble extensions of the trial, because the substance of any discussion
which takes place is common information, even if not part of the
official record. In addition, when all interests are represented there
is less chance for bias to develop. 7
3. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Section 455(a) 8 is the statutory codification of Canon 3(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 39 It requires
any judge to disqualify himself from any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The statute has been
interpreted to allow a judge to develop an opinion about a case as
40
long as his information does not come from extrajudicialsources.
Information derived from participation in the normal judicial process does not constitute improper conduct.
III. TOWARDS SUBSTANTIVELY JUST SETTLEMENTS: FOCUSING ON
COERCION

Alone among the guides to pretrial judicial conduct, the Manual for Complex Litigation, Second (the "Manual") shifts away
from the focus on the judge's impartiality at a hypothetical future
trial, and focuses on judicial conduct during settlement negotiations. Even so, in spite of its focus on judicial conduct during nego36 Id.
37 The prohibition of ex parte communications extends to the lawyers as well as to the
judge. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that opposing counsel be
present any time the case is discussed with the judge: "A lawyer may not informally discuss
a case with the judge without the other lawyer's presence nor should the judge permit this."
Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility (IICLE 1975). The judge and the attorneys
together must avoid extrajudicial contacts that may affect the judge's ability to hear the
case impartially.

38 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1987). Section 455(a) reads: "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." It incorporates the possible sources of partiality from the Code
of Judicial Conduct. See note 34.
"' Disqualification of Judges, P.L. 93-512, 1974 U.S. Cong. Code and Admin. News
6351.
40 See Matter of Georgia Paneling Supply, Inc., 581 F.2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1978), va-

cated, 588 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1978), reinstated upon panel rehearing, 607 F.2d 117, 118 (5th
Cir. 1979), reinstated upon rehearing, 616 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying § 455(a)). See

note 27.
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tiation, the Manual fails to recognize the coercion inherent in certain of the techniques it recommends for encouraging settlement.
A.

Manual for Complex Litigation, Second: Recognition of the
Fact of Settlement

The Manual was written to provide a guide for lawyers and
judges involved in large, complex cases, such as class actions. It
describes the role of the judge in complex litigation, and it is one
of the few sources that attempts to guard against the hazard of
coercion inherent in judicial involvement in the settlement
process.4 1

Some of the practices outlined in the Manual are intended to
make it easier for the parties to approach the topic of settlement.

These include: (1) inquiring whether the parties have considered
settlement; (2) urging the parties to consider settlement; and (3)
bringing up the subject of settlement so that neither party is seen
as weak or unconvinced of his side of the case.42 These practices
facilitate settlement without utilizing the power inherent in the
43
judge's position to force settlement.

Unfortunately, other suggestions in the Manual demonstrate
that the drafters did not fully recognize the particular dangers of
linking mediative and adjudicative roles. These suggestions include: (1) giving an opinion of the merits of the case with all parties present or notified; (2) giving an opinion as to the justness of
11It is interesting to note that Judges Will, Merhige and Rubin were among the writers
of the section of the Manual on the role of the court in managing complex litigation. This
explains the similarity in the techniques suggested by the Manual and those recommended
by the judges in the Seminars for Newly Appointed Judges. See note 7.
42 MCL 2d § 23.11 at 160 (cited in note 31). See also Judge Rubin on settlement as a
sign of weakness. Merhige and Rubin, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process at
18 (cited in note 7).
'3 The Manual also suggests alternatives to the judge getting involved in the settlement
negotiations. It proposes that a mini-trial or summary jury trial be conducted as a method
of helping the parties reach agreement without creating the link between adjudicative and
mediative judicial functions. In a mini-trial, counsel present their cases before the parties'
representatives who have settlement authority, with a neutral third party presiding as judge.
Afterward, the third party mediates between the parties' representatives to assist them in
reaching a settlement. In a summary jury trial, the parties make an abbreviated presentation of their case to a jury, using witnesses if desired, but under severe time constraints. The
jurors then return a verdict which may help the parties reach a settlement. MCL 2d § 23.12
at 163. For a more complete description of summary jury trials see Lambros, 29 Vill. L. Rev.
at 1373-78 (cited in note 9).
Yet another way of implementing the idea of removing the judge from direct involvement is to have a pretrial screening panel to eliminate cases even before a judge is assigned
to the case. Steven Flanders, Case Management and Court Management in United States
District Courts 39 (1977).
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proposed settlement terms; (3) estimating the expected cost of
trial; (4) pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the parties'
positions; (5) suggesting areas of agreement; (6) recommending
terms of settlement;
and (7) meeting separately with the parties,
44
even if all consent.
All of these suggestions involve the risk of coercion, and some
of them, such as giving an opinion of the merits of the case or of
the justness of the proposed settlement, make explicit use of a
judge's unique position in order to enhance the possibility of settlement. If, for example, the judge points out strengths and weaknesses of the case, the parties may construe the judge's pretrial
views as a forecast of how he or she will decide the case. The same
problem of the parties' adopting the judge's views arises when the
judge proposes areas of agreement or terms of settlement." Finally, when a judge meets separately with the parties there is
greater opportunity to emphasize particular views for strategic and
coercive effect without the balancing presence of the opposing
4
party. 6
In all of these circumstances, where a judge who actively seeks
to settle a case succeeds in imposing his views on the parties, the
resulting settlement becomes, in effect, an unreviewable decision
on the merits by the judge. The judge will never be called upon to
justify or even publicly articulate his or her position on the point
of law.
The Manual recognizes this concern in part, specifically warning judges against the "temptation to become an advocate-either
in favor of the settlement because of a desire to conclude the litigation, or against the settlement because of the responsibility to protect the rights of those not parties to the settlement. '47 But this
admonition is not consistently reflected in the Manual's procedural
suggestions.
B.

4
Special Masters "

A common misconception has developed that a judge can
MCL 2d § 23.11 at 161 (cited in note 31).
'5 This is particularly a problem in class actions, because the judge is called upon to
approve the settlement once it has been proposed. The Manual expresses concern that a
judge who helps write a settlement will be unable to evaluate it impartially for fairness,
reasonableness and adequacy, as required by Federal Rule 23(e). MCL 2d § 30.44 at 242.
See also note 59 on Rule 23(e).
46 MCL 2d § 23.11 at 161. See also text at notes 42-44.
17 MCL 2d § 23.14 at 166.
48 See Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 16 (1983) (discussion of Rule 16(a)(5)) Fed44
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avoid the problem of bias simply by avoiding direct personal involvement in the case. The appointment of special masters to handle pretrial matters and settlement negotiations does eliminate direct judicial influence on parties, but this technique still is not the
perfect solution. Unlike the judge, a special master has the flexibility to go to the parties separately and obtain the information necessary to structure a settlement. However, the familiar risk of bias
and coercion remains present where special masters influence or
are influenced by the judge. In extreme instances, they may be
mere puppets, such as where the judge appoints a master to implement his or her ideas about settlement rather than the ideas of the
parties. In addition, the master approaches the parties in the
judge's name, which may intimidate the parties and compromise
their right to a result that is both socially legitimate and mutually
agreeable to them.49
One case addressing special master bias was United States v.
Conservation Chemical Co., 50 where the court appointed a special
master to resolve a dispute over cleanup of a chemical waste disposal site. The master, rather than the judge, engaged in ex parte
meetings with the parties in which the parties were encouraged to
express their settlement positions candidly. The master acquired
extensive off-the-record information. The reviewing court subjected the master's conduct to the same scrutiny as that of a judge,
because there was a danger that the master could pass information
and biases on to the judge.
The problem is not that information might have been revealed
to the judge, but that the special master may have communicated

eral Rules of Civil Procedure. See also MCL 2d § 23.12 at 162 (cited in note 31).
" The risk of the parties misperceiving the authority of the master is reduced when
the parties have had a hand in the selection of the master. On the other hand, sometimes
the master is intended to be an agent of the judge, especially when the master's role is to
provide technical information or to develop a remedy following a judgment or decree.
For instance, in Hart v. Community School Board, 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), a
school desegregation case, the judge directed submission of integration plans by the parties,
but when the submitted plans proved unacceptable, he appointed a master to work with the
parties directly to develop an acceptable plan. The master reported to the court on factual
matters and party disputes, and he facilitated communications between the parties. The
judge could have ordered the remedy himself in the first place, therefore any bias that could
have arisen would have been less problematic than in instances where the judge is expected
to remain impartial. The standard of conduct for the master was correspondingly lenient.
On the other hand, when the master's role is specifically that of settlement master, the
standard of impartiality and non-coercion is the same as for judges. For the special master's
account of what he did for the judge in Hart, see Curtis J. Berger, Away From the Courthouse and into the Field: The Odyssey of A Special Master, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 707 (1978).
50 106 F.R.D. 210, 234 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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the judge's opinions to the parties. When a special master uses the
judge's opinion to coerce the parties, it is as if the judge has done
it himself.
It is important to note that the use of special masters may
sometimes help alleviate the problem of coercion, but only if the
judge maintains the same distance from the special master that he
must maintain from the parties. As soon as the master begins to
speak for the judge, or even seems to do so, the risk of coercion
reappears.
Appropriate behavior by special masters is distinguishable
from appropriate behavior by judges. The use of special settlement
masters avoids the link between mediator and adjudicator. When
the judge states an opinion it has a powerful influence on the conduct of the negotiations. This is less true when a special master
states what he sees as a problem with the case, or an opinion about
the law. Thus, special masters are free to say what they want and
do what they want in seeking a settlement so long as they make
sure that it is possible to distinguish their actions and opinions
from those of the judge.
C.

The Agent Orange Example

The lack of guidance provided by the "impartiality at trial"
standard can be seen clearly by examining Judge Weinstein's conduct in In Re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation.5 The
focus of the current guidelines upon objectivity at trial allowed
Judge Weinstein to state his opinion of the case," while at least by
53
his own testimony retaining sufficient objectivity to try the case.
Even taking Judge Weinstein at his word, his behavior was nothing
short of outrageous. As Peter Schuck points out, from the moment
that Judge Weinstein took over the case, his gdal was to achieve a
54
settlement.
Still, less than two weeks before trial, the parties were more
than a quarter of a billion dollars apart. In order to resolve these
differences, the judge convened a forty-eight hour non-stop negotiating session. During the course of the session, the parties were

1, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). For a detailed description of Judge Weinstein's
activity see Schuck, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337 (cited in note 14). See also Peter H. Schuck,
Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts (1986).

" Schuck, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 361-62 (cited in note 14). In open court, Judge Weinstein "denounced the 'injustices' [suffered by the Vietnam veterans]," and stated that he
believed that "[tihey and their families should receive ... financial support." Id. at 343.
53 Id. at 360. See also text at note 58.
" Id. at 343.
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separated and the special master engaged in "shuttle diplomacy,"
passing offers between the parties and attempting to loosen their
entrenched positions.
Throughout these negotiations, it was made clear to the parties that the special master, Kenneth Feinberg, was communicating
closely with the judge and that he had the authority to speak for
him. In addition, the judge appeared on several occasions to encourage settlement himself.5
Most importantly, during the course of the negotiations the
judge and the master emphasized different points to the opposing
parties, in the hope of achieving agreement. For example, the judge
emphasized the hopelessness of the plaintiff's case on medical causation to the plaintiffs, while emphasizing the uncertainty of outcome to the defendants.5
Assuming that nothing the judge did would actually compromise his impartiality at trial-a trial which Judge Weinstein did
everything in his power to avoid-nothing in the existing rules explicitly forbade his conduct. Yet, the settlement could hardly be
57
described as a settlement "of the parties.
Judge Weinstein's conduct demonstrates clearly the problem
of coercion and the fact that the current canons of ethics are insufficient to guard against such behavior. He made statements about
the value of the case. He spoke through his special master. He separated the parties in order to make his statements even more coercive. In negotiating the settlement, Judge Weinstein not only did
not avoid exploiting the enhanced power of his position, he exploited it to its fullest. An example can be seen in a lawyer's descriptions of the judge's statements during the negotiations:
He would say: "Now I am not going to hold it against you
if you don't settle. I am not going to penalize you. I am
going to conduct this trial on a fair basis to everybody,"
55 Id.

at 345.

5' Id. See also In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. at 777787.
5- The settlement was nevertheless approved by the Second Circuit. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). It is important to note that
the court recognized that although the settlement was not unfair, it was also not strictly a
settlement of the parties. The amount of the settlement, $180 million, was extraordinary in
light of the fact that Judge Weinstein had determined that the plaintiffs had little hope of
prevailing on the causation issues. It was essentially a payment of nuisance value, accounting mostly for the attorneys' fees which the defendants would have incurred if they continued the litigation. If the plaintiffs had had any chance of succeeding at trial, the defendants'
potential liability would have been huge. Thus, the fairness of the settlement depended
solely on Judge Weinstein's determination that the plaintiffs' case was weak. Id. at 151.
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and then came the "but" ....
"But," he would say, "I have carried you plaintiffs
all this time. I have decided a lot of questions in your
favor I could have decided the other way. And I want you
to know that at nine o'clock Monday morning [when the
trial was to begin] I am through carrying you. You are on
your own. I will do my duty as a Judge."
Then a little conversation would take place and then
he would come back and say: "You know, remember, I
just don't think you have got a case on medical causation.
58
I don't think you have a case on punitive damages.

One factor in Agent Orange relieves some of the concern regarding the lack of procedural safeguards and public decision making. The case was a class action, and therefore the settlement required judicial approval and thus became subject to judicial
review. In approving the settlement, as required by Rule 23(e),"9
Judge Weinstein articulated his reasons for doing so. In addition,
numerous objectors attempted to block the settlement and have in
fact subjected it to public' scrutiny. The Second Circuit ultimately
reviewed the settlement and determined that it was fair in spite of
the method by which it was reached. 0 Although the codes of ethic Schuck,

53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 360 (cited in note 14).
Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(e) (1986): "Rule 23(e). Dismissal or Compromise. A class
action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs."
60The Second Circuit found the settlement reasonable in spite of various factors such
as the attorneys' fee arrangement which could have affected the fairness of the settlement.
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d at 174. Interestingly, the court
declined to criticize Judge Weinstein's conduct directly, only mentioning in passing that
appellants had previously attacked Weinstein's extensive involvement in the negotiations.
Nevertheless, the court's description of the settlement process reflects the competing incentives to settle.
There is ... great pressure to settle. Indeed, a settlement in a case such as the
instant litigation, dramatically arrived at just before dawn on the day of trial after
sleepless hours of bargaining, seems almost as inevitable as the sunrise. Such a
settlement, however, is not likely to lead to a fund that can be distributed among
the large number of class members .... Moreover, the ability of the district court
to scrutinize the fairness of the settlement is greatly impaired where the legal and
factual issues to be determined in the class action are as numerous and complex as
they were under the district court's order in the instant case. Similarly, the fashioning of a distribution plan that is both fair to the strong plaintiffs and efficient
in adjudicating the large number of claims may be impossible. Only the weakness
of the evidence of causation as to all plaintiffs and the strength of the military
contractor defense enabled the district court to evaluate the settlement accurately
and to fashion an appropriate distribution scheme in the instant matter. We regard those factors as largely coincidental and not to be expected in all toxic exposure cases.
Id. at 166.
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cal conduct were not sufficient to guarantee a fair, non-coerced result, the eventual judicial review provided some protection against
any substantive injustice resulting from judicial coercion. Judge
Weinstein provides us with a public example of judicial coercion,
but there is reason to believe that this occurs in other less public
cases as well, where the size of the case does not generate such
public scrutiny.

IV.

THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

It is not sufficient during settlement negotiations to protect
only the judge's impartiality at a hypothetical future trial, yet this
is precisely the limited focus of the existing codes and statutes.
The primary function of special masters and of the quasi-trials
suggested by the Manual for Complex Litigation is distancing the
judge from the parties in order to preserve his or her impartiality.
The problem of coerced settlement is not directly addressed. However, these techniques do provide a model that can serve as a starting point for judicial conduct that provides guidance for the judge
during settlement negotiations.6 '
The two elements which guard against judicial coercion of settlement are (1) techniques which allow the judge to facilitate settlement while maintaining his distance, and, more importantly, (2)

Under these circumstances it is not at all clear that a reasonable result was guaranteed
by the judicial process. If the case were not a class action, Judge Weinstein's determination
that the plaintiffs' case was weak would not have been explained in a written opinion, and it
would not have been subject to review. Here, the Second Circuit analyzes Weinstein's finding and agrees with his determination. Since it finds the settlement fair on its face there is
no need to take into account the questionable techniques in reaching it.
61 The standards of conduct for arbitrators provide an alternative method of regulating
the mediative function. In arbitration, as in settlement negotiations, the arbitrator has contact with the parties, and he must not be improperly influenced by then Unlike judges,
however, there is only the award at issue-no subsequent trial. In addition, arbitrators are
not appointed for life. If their conduct is unsatisfactory they may not be asked to arbitrate
again. This factor is absent from judicial standards even if settlements are made subject to
appellate review.
The standard of review utilized by courts examining arbitration awards is one of "undue means." "Undue means" implies that an arbitrator's decision was based on improperly
obtained information or other unethical conduct such as ex parte communications. Where
undue means are proved, an award may be vacated. See Crosby-Ironton Federation of
Teachers, Local 1325 v. Independent School District No. 182, 285 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 1979)
(ex parte communications raise a strong presumption that the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means); City of Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Police Department,
236 N.W.2d 231 (Wis. 1975) (ex parte contacts create a rebuttable presumption that the
award was procured by undue means)..
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public scrutiny of judicial action as a safeguard of judicial impartiality. It would be impractical to require the same level of public
scrutiny of settlements as is required at trial, but there are a number of ways by which public scrutiny might be encouraged without
undue cost.
One way to facilitate public scrutiny of judicial conduct is creation of a written record. A court reporter should be required at
every meeting where the judge is present and settlement is discussed. The hazards of ex parte communications would thereby be
minimized.
A second way to facilitate public scrutiny would be to extend
to all cases which settle subsequent to the pretrial conference, the
requirement of Federal Rule 23(e) that a judge formally find that a
settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. Such a finding would
be unnecessary where the parties settled prior to the pretrial conference, because that settlement would be a private act.
The chief goal of the judicial system is to promote just resolution of disputes. The concern that justice may be compromised by
the judges to whom it is entrusted has led to principles of conduct
aimed at preserving impartiality at trial. It is incumbent upon the
system to protect the justness of settlements as well as the justness
of judgments. By adding these procedures to the settlement process, settlement loses a measure of its speed, but procedure will
ensure greater judicial accountability and hopefully provide more
just results.
Laura M. Warshawsky

